Beyond retrieval: A proposal to expand the design space of classification by Feinberg, Melanie
Feinberg, M. (2007).  Beyond retrieval: A proposal to expand the design space of classification.  




University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA 
 
 




Abstract: In Information Science, the creation of classification schemes has been more commonly 
described in the mode of scientific discovery, as opposed to artifact design. From the literary warrant of 
Hulme to the terminological warrant of the Classification Research Group (CRG), to Hjørland’s domain 
analysis, the classificationist seems like one who documents and compiles, and not one who actively 
shapes design. Outside of Information Science, however, classification is used as an active argument to 
structure interpretations (in linguistics and philosophy) and as a means of coordinating and imposing 
order on work practices (in studies of information systems). In this paper, I suggest that classification 
researchers should investigate a wider variety of design possibilities, in which the purpose of a 
classification is not assumed to be a retrieval tool in the traditional manner. A consequence of an 
expanded design space is that standard classification manuals and guides become insufficient support for 
the design process; a new research area might be the facilitation of problem-setting aspects of 
classification design. One avenue of possible research involves the description of a design language, 
following the description of such by Lowgren and Stolterman (2004) and Donald Schon (1983). A design 
language, which might be operationalized as a set of product qualities, might provide a framework by 




Within Information Science, the primary purpose of knowledge organization schemes 
(henceforth generically referred to as “classifications”) is often described as information 
retrieval, or the provision of relevant documents to match a user query (for example, Soergel, 
1974; Svenonius, 2003). (The relevant documents might be identified with an indexing term or 
class number, arranged in advance on a shelf or assembled by request using an online system.) In 
this paper, I contend that a retrieval emphasis, combined with a prevailing sense that 
classifications should document some existing state of affairs (as opposed to actively 
constructing a particular interpretation of the world), unduly limits classification design. Using 
two examples from outside the literature of knowledge organization, I illustrate additional 
purposes for classification and suggest that these might be equally appropriate for document 
classification. Especially as full-text search becomes increasingly effective for basic retrieval 
tasks, exploring other goals and uses of classification seems not only viable, but necessary.  
I propose that future research in classification should address the limitations of current 
design methods, which focus on the creation of retrieval tools, and consider an expanded design 
space. While the plurality of possibilities for creating a classification may not allow the 
specification of precise, standard methods, where one clearly identified step always and 
inevitably follows another, we may be able to facilitate the design process without rigidly 
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specifying it. One example is to describe a design language, or set of dimensions for the design 
space, to help classification creators better map their own terrain.    
 
 
2. Traditions from bibliographic classification: Classification as retrieval tool 
The purpose of bibliographic classification is often described as information retrieval. 
The goal of finding information quickly is a consistent theme: just a few examples include 
Hulme (who notes that “book classification is a mechanical time-saving operation. . . the 
discovery of knowledge in books by the shortest route [is] our aim and object”), Foskett (“the 
aim of an information service is to organise the literature on a systematic basis in order to save 
the time of research workers”) and Svenonius (“within the discipline of Library and Information 
Science, CVs [controlled vocabularies] are used primarily to assist in the retrieval of 
information”) (Hulme, 1911; Foskett, 1974; Svenonius, 2003).  
Some might assert that especially the earlier classificationists subordinated the 
practicalities of retrieval in an attempt to create theoretically sound systems. Bliss, particularly, 
attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for his library system by using philosophically 
derived ideas about the order of sciences as the basis for class structure (Bliss, 1929). However, 
Miksa (1998) notes that despite this overt interest in theoretical justifications from logic and 
philosophy, library classification has always had a significant pragmatic element. For example, 
even though the classificationists Richardson and Sayers believed that classifications should 
follow principles of logic and reflect the “natural order” of the sciences, they were equally 
practicing librarians who were likely to appeal to common sense as a justification for adjusting 
the “natural order” so that patrons could more easily locate books on the shelves (Richardson, 
1930; Sayers, 1915). Richardson, for example, argues that “the need of adjusting theoretical 
classification to practical conditions. . . is characteristic of the treatment of all complex concrete 
things,” and “the object of classification is thus economy and increased efficiency in the use of 
books.” Miksa (1998) suggests that the retrieval focus of bibliographic classification deepened 
still further in the 1950s, as the documentation movement, enamored with the needs of specialists 
and scientists, competed with traditions of librarianship.  
If the emphasis on retrieval and classification has been reasonably consistent in the 
literature, the idea of classification as a reflection of reality (as opposed to an original 
construction of reality, or as an actively designed product) has been even more influential. In a 
theoretically derived classification, the goal would be to reflect the true order of all things; 
however, a more pragmatic classification is also typically seen as a reflection, albeit of a more 
relative order of reality. The enduring concept of literary warrant directs that a classification 
should document the world of subjects as exhibited by published works (Hulme, 1911). Even as 
the idea of general, enumerative classifications that specified classes explicitly lost favor in the 
mid-twentieth century to “special,” analytic-synthetico (faceted) classifications that presented 
basic concepts in a particular area, to be combined into complex subjects as necessary, literary 
warrant remained a key semantic concept in classification development. As Beghtol (1986) 
notes, literary warrant merely evolved into terminological warrant, and a classification was seen 
as documenting the way that language is used to represent concepts in a single discipline.  
Feinberg, M. (2007).  Beyond retrieval: A proposal to expand the design space of classification.  
Proceedings of the North American Symposium on Knowledge Organization. Vol. 1.   
Available: http://dlist.sir.arizona.edu/1892 
 33 
While mid-century classificationists such as those involved in the Classification Research 
Group (CRG) recognized that different subject areas would require different approaches to 
classification, they did not give up the goal of accurately documenting a sort of true reality. 
Instead, they attempted to isolate smaller, self-contained “realities” in particular subject areas. 
For example, a series of books by members of the CRG discusses the need to accommodate 
different approaches to classification as required by the sciences, the social sciences, and the 
humanities (Foskett, 1974; Langridge, 1976; Vickery, 1975). In his work on classification in the 
humanities, Langridge (1976) agrees that “diverse characteristics” of division are required to 
serve “different interests” in classification. For example, Langridge explains, a rabbit might be 
characterized as a physical type, as a grassland animal, as a pest, and so on. However, Langridge 
continues, within the sphere of zoology, rabbits are primarily studied as physical types, which 
should therefore determine their placement in a zoological classification, even though habitat 
(and so the rabbit as grassland animal) may also be of interest. While the classification of rabbits 
may differ according to the discipline under consideration, one should be able within a single 
discipline to identify a “clearly predominant” characteristic that applies to rabbits; it is the 
classificationist’s duty to discover that characteristic and document it in the classification. This 
apparent contradiction—that there are different, equally valid ways to classify and yet that within 
a particular discipline, a predominant characteristic can be identified—seems tightly connected 
to the goal of creating a retrieval tool and to the vestigial necessity of creating a linear order for 
library shelves. If classification’s purpose is to locate information more quickly, then it needs to 
be commensurate with (what the classificationist sees as) likely user queries. We should put the 
books on rabbits where most zoologists will expect them.  
The domain analytic approach described by Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) does not 
challenge the majority of these assumptions. Hjørland’s primary innovation is to dispute the 
existence of “clearly predominant” characteristics for classification. For Hjørland, a subject 
discipline includes a variety of sometimes conflicting approaches to the subject matter. In 
Hjørland’s (1998) study of the domain of psychology, he describes a domain as constituted by 
the relationships between phenomena under investigation and epistemological perspectives that 
shape the research. A domain, for Hjørland, seems to be the union of the approaches used to 
study it, and so includes various sets of concepts for a single phenomenon, as defined by the 
included approaches. Psychology, for example, includes both “personality” as defined by 
behaviorism and “personality” as defined by psychoanalysis. This is certainly a more complex 
view of a discipline than Langridge describes. However, this just makes for a more complicated 
structure to document in a classification (which becomes technically possible when we don’t 
need to think so much about a single place for physical items). Hjørland states that “a 
psychological classification should represent all the most important approaches and 
subdisciplines in psychology”; similarly, Abrahamsen’s domain analysis of music indexing 
concludes that the organization of music should combine the perspectives on musicology that he 
describes (Hjørland, 1998; Abrahamsen, 2003). While Hjørland(1998) asserts that classification 
is not neutral and is theory-laden, this seems to be based more on the idea that the material to be 
classified is theory-laden, than that classificationist is actively designing a certain view in the 
classification. A domain, for example of psychology, exists; it seems to be the classificationist’s 
job to find and describe it, not to define or build it.  
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Of course, there is nothing inherently problematic about the idea of classification as a 
retrieval tool that achieves its effectiveness through encapsulating the variety of perspectives in a 
particular domain as faithfully as possible. This may be a perfectly valid and useful strategy to 
address a particular design situation. I would suggest, however, that because of the messiness 
that Hjørland describes, the role of the classificationist in shaping the design will be much more 
active than is typically acknowledged. It is not possible to merely compile a classification 
without making authorial types of decisions, although one may attempt to keep such intrusions at 
a minimum. Moreover, as the following two examples from non-bibliographic classification 
show, other possibilities for design may also exist. Especially as full-text search becomes more 




3. Example 1: Classification as argument  
In contrast to Information Science, work from philosophy and cognitive linguistics 
portrays classification as an argument for a particular interpretation of reality. George Lakoff 
(1987) contends that the way people categorize is inextricably bound with the way that human 
beings perceive the world, shaped both by our physical characteristics and by the social 
structures that we inhabit. Categorization is conditioned by idealized cognitive models (ICMs), 
which provide a basic template for typical categorization decisions. We have a cognitive model 
of, for example, what a lie is, and this helps us determine whether or not a particular utterance 
should be called a lie. But ICMs are incomplete; the world is full of debatable cases. Reasonable 
people may disagree that the omission of information is a lie. Using an example from Winograd 
and Flores (1986), if someone says “I’m sorry that I missed the meeting. I had a flat tire,” and yet 
the flat tire was not actually the cause of missing the meeting, is it a lie? A determination here is 
influenced by the ICM (and, undoubtedly, one’s role in the communication), but it is equally a 
decision about what the category of lie means in that situation.    
Bryant’s (2000) work in philosophy elucidates how even an “expert scientific” 
classification may be chosen to advance a particular agenda, and yet may also be “true” in that it 
creates an effective argument for a particular interpretation of reality. One of Bryant’s examples 
shows how the category “dinosaur” was created by a British scientist, Robert Owen. Previously, 
dinosaurs had been seen as “fossil lizards,” or simply extremely large reptiles. Owen used a 
particular set of physical characteristics in the fossil record to argue that, in a certain sense, 
“dinosaurs” were a separate class, in some ways more related to mammals than to extant reptiles. 
Bryant notes that previous scientists had seen the same evidence as Owen and yet had not 
focused on the mammalian characteristics of dinosaurs as opposed to the reptilian ones. Owen 
did not see more evidence than his predecessors did; he just saw the available evidence 
differently. Owen, it seems, was particularly motivated to create a new explanation for 
“dinosaurian” characteristics because he saw the opportunity to use this explanation as a means 
of discrediting the biological theory of Lamarckism (a form of evolution in which species 
progressed from simple life forms to the complex perfection of human beings). Bryant contends 
that Owen was also hoping to discredit a personal enemy, a follower of Lamarck. Owen 
accomplished both ends by creating a persuasive classification. As the philosopher Broadfield 
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notes, the scientist’s “interest is not so much in finding a ground of agreement with other 
workers on the comparative excellence of various processes, as in proving by a demonstration of 
the superiority of his own the reasonableness of his dissent” (Broadfield, 1946). Scientific 
classification progresses via disagreement and argument.  
Following Bryant and Broadfield’s line of thinking, scientific classification doesn’t just 
document reality; it interprets reality and so creates knowledge. While some Information Science 
researchers, such as Hjørland, might agree that document classifications interpret reality as well, 
they are less likely to acknowledge (much less encourage) the possible role of the 
classificationist in designing this interpretation. The Information Science emphasis on retrieval 
as the primary purpose of classification can obfuscate the degree to which classifications are 
designed and not discovered. The characterization of classification as argument emphasizes that 
the purpose of a classification is not given, but chosen. It also illustrates the extent to which a 
classification’s nature as a document, as being authored (in the sense of being a creative 
product), can be foregrounded. These properties do not appear restricted to scientific 
classification, but can be extended to the organization of documents. For example, a historian 
might classify a collection of archival documents according to personal interpretation of an era, 
or a gourmet might classify a collection of recipes according to the progression of his or her 
personal taste. This might be a fascinating way to explore previously unanticipated relationships 
between items and locate interesting documents (and yet utility as a retrieval tool would 
undoubtedly be poor, if we take retrieval in the typical restricted sense of matching documents to 
a query). Indeed, it is my contention that, just as Bryant advocated for perceiving scientific 
classifications as arguments for interpretations of reality and not as inert reflections of it, so 
should bibliographic classifications be seen as arguments for interpretations of a subject area and 
not reflections of how a subject area “really is.” When bibliographic classification is created 
under the currently dominant retrieval paradigm, designers are attempting to make 
uncontroversial arguments. But a document classification can also make controversial or unique 
arguments and still be useful. One might find a the perfect recipe for an upcoming soiree in the 
gourmet’s collection, but it might be an unexpected result via an unanticipated path.    
Beghtol (2003) compared “naive” classifications to “professional” classifications, 
claiming that naive classifications are created through scholarly activity for a variety of purposes 
related to knowledge discovery, while professional classifications are created to facilitate 
document retrieval. Beghtol recognized similarities of construction between naive and 
professional classifications, but concluded “that the purposes of naive knowledge discovery 
classifications differ markedly from the purposes of professional information retrieval 
classifications,” which are “designed to help users find documents.” Beghtol’s naive 
classifications are similar to the scientific classifications that I have been discussing, and her 
professional classifications are document, or bibliographic, classifications. However, where 
Beghtol sees difference, I see a continuum of similarity. Professional classifications are already 
to a certain extent like naive classifications—there is already an element of authorship, of 
creative decision-making, associated with them. In addition, if appropriate for the design 
situation, there is no reason that the gap between professional and naive classifications could not 
narrow. Researchers persist, however, in viewing the classification design space as quite limited. 
In a response to Beghtol, Hjørland and Nicolaisen (2004) object to her use of the word “naive” 
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and claim that, if anything, library classifications are “naive” if they do not accurately reflect 
scientific and scholarly consensus. Hjørland and Nicolaisen assert that if the field of knowledge 
organization fails to acknowledge the authority of scientific and scholarly classifications, it will 
be “totally disrespected and disregarded by the rest of the intellectual world.” I suggest that 
Hjørland and Nicolaisen see reliance on expert knowledge as necessary primarily because they 
consider classification in Information Science as building retrieval tools for specialists (where 
retrieval means matching documents to queries). However, if we allow ourselves to expand the 
design space for document classification to involve other purposes (such as those that Beghtol 
describes for “naive” classifications and beyond), then we might readily explore different 
constructions. Contrary to what Hjørland and Nicolaisen assert, I propose that this does not make 
knowledge organization unscientific; indeed, as the work of Bryant (2000) emphasizes, the 
practice of science involves reinterpreting or contradicting received wisdom when it does not fit 
a particular situation.  
 
 
4. Example 2: Classification as an element of work practice 
Studies of information systems in work contexts show classification as a means of 
coordinating ongoing projects. While some classifications are used to order collections of 
documents, the purpose of these classifications is not merely retrieval, particularly in the sense of 
information seeking commonly employed within Information Science (a user has a query and 
requires information to satisfy that query). Schmidt and Wagner (2004) describe a variety of 
classifications in their study of how a Viennese architecture firm coordinates its work activities. 
As one example, a system for separating CAD drawings into layers and systematically naming 
each layer enables concurrent, iterative work on building plans. As Schmidt and Wagner relate, 
one person can work on all the fire escapes in the building while outside consultants 
simultaneously work on the ventilation shafts. While the layer organization shows regularities, 
for building projects in general and within particular offices, there is also significant variation 
according to the dynamic project situation. Creating and evolving the layer organization 
conventions is “a recurrent concern in the office.” The firm relies on a number of such 
coordinative artifacts and associated practices, which have a range of ordering functions (besides 
enabling division of labor and efficient progress, other functions include maintaining consistency 
of both work processes and work products, enabling version control, and supporting the 
documentation of regulatory requirements).  
As another example, Christiansen (1996) investigates the work of Danish police 
detectives. Christiansen frames the work of fraud detectives as the compilation of evidence, with 
the result as a final report on the crime. The fraud detectives that Christiansen studied developed 
their own database to manage their work. Christiansen describes how the detectives took 
advantage of the process of organizing information in their database to “systematically walk 
through and overview the problems of the case.” As work progressed and their sense of the case 
changed, the detectives would “rearrange the setup so that the menu and key words always 
reflected their current overall conceptualization of the case.” In addition to helping the detectives 
organize their ongoing work, use of the database helped the detectives “feel much more 
confident that everything would be in the final report.”  
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Similarly, in describing their development of document management software for 
transportation engineers, Trigg, Blomberg, and Suchman (1999) emphasize that a document 
repository is not merely the software and hardware associated with electronic storage, but a 
system that involves activities such as preparation and submission of documents, indexing and 
other metadata creation (and editing of this information as projects evolve), adaptation of the 
system, and so on. The activities must be coordinated: with other activities, with the people 
involved, and with other tools in the system (such as the document scanning tools). As described 
in the work of Schmidt and Wagner, Christiansen, and Trigg, Blomberg, and Suchman, 
classification is not merely a retrieval tool, nor does its success depend on detailed 
documentation of the work context; instead, the classification is one element of the ongoing 
construction of a work context. These studies emphasize both the embeddedness and dynamic 
aspects of the classifications they discuss. In order to understand these classifications, one needs 
to understand the people involved with them (classificationists, classifiers, different types of 
classification users), the processes associated with them, and the other tools that make up the 
system. When thinking about classification in this way, the design process involves not only 
what kind of tool should be designed, but the question of how other elements of the system need 
to adapt. In some sense the work itself enters the design space.   
Although recent work in bibliographic classification emphasizes the importance of work 
context, the focus on classification as retrieval tool seems to limit the perceived design space to 
exact documentation of the work situation, while the idea of a classification as participant in the 
work itself seems broader than this. For example, Mai (2004) describes the cognitive work 
analysis approach to classification design as aiming “to design classification schemes that reflect 
implicit and explicit invariant structures of the work domain”; according to Mai, “the key 
notion” of this design approach “is that the classificatory structures in ecological classification 
schemes reflect the work habits of actors using the systems. . .” If a classification’s purpose is to 
facilitate ongoing work, it’s not clear that reflecting the specific details of existing practice is the 
only, or best, way to do so. In the architects’ case, Schmidt and Wagner (2000) assert that the 
classifications are necessary to impose order on heterogeneous (and otherwise chaotic) local 
practices; the classifications are constructed out of the work practices of the various collaborators 
and the more global conventions of the building trades, but don’t merely reflect the practice of 
any particular group. And yet because specific activities have particular needs, and because work 
is always changing, the tension between “global ordering systems and the enduring or emerging 
local concerns and issues” becomes a key element in the design situation. Schmidt and Wagner 
see a balance between uniformity and flexibility as a key design concern. For example, the 
architects base project-specific catalogs of design components on the specifications used in 
reference catalogs, sometimes modifying them for particular needs. Using the standard 
specifications has several advantages: it takes less time, and the standard specifications are easily 
understood by outside collaborators (the construction engineers, and so on). Similarly, in their 
discussion of requirements for infrastructures, Star and Ruhleder (1996) note “the competing 
requirements of openness and malleability, coupled with structure,” and Suchman (2002) warns 
that “some appropriation into local circumstances will always be required. The question is not 
whether that work will need to be done, but with what ease or difficulty.” These assertions seem 
to indicate that a classification that is too specific and detailed, in a sense too faithful to existing 
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and particular work practices, is not always the best design strategy. For example, it might be 
more useful, when considering Schmidt and Wagner’s architects, to design flexible and 
extensible core classifications (such as modifying the component catalog to make it easier to 
adapt in different types of work situations), as opposed to creating an extremely detailed 
snapshot of current practice.  
 
 
5. The expanded design space and design research 
The two example perspectives from non-bibliographic classification are as different from 
each other as they are from current conceptions of document classification. A scientific 
classification presents an original argument; it’s not a comprehensive system in the same way as 
a classification that structures activity between heterogeneous actors. In the design process, very 
different questions might apply to each. And yet both perspectives might be effectively 
employed when designing a document classification. These examples show that a classification’s 
purpose cannot be assumed when beginning a design project. Even for the organization of 
documents, it might be appropriate to design something other than the traditional concept of a 
retrieval tool.  
The classic guides to create bibliographic classifications present their design as a well-
defined problem (build a retrieval system) to be solved through a relatively constrained process. 
Soergel assumes that the decision to build a thesaurus has already been made (Soergel, 1974). 
Vickery similarly begins with the idea that a classification is needed (Vickery, 1960). Aitchison, 
Gilchrist, and Bawden briefly discuss only the relative benefits of thesauri and full-text search, 
and then proceed with instructions for creating a thesaurus (Aitchison, Gilchrist, and Bawden, 
2000). These guides can be quite detailed, and include an array of definitions, prescriptive 
details, and process steps. But they are reticent about how to approach conceptual work, even 
within the proscribed goal of building a retrieval tool. (For example, Aitchison, Gilchrist, and 
Bawden may describe what part of speech to use for thesaurus terms, but they don’t provide 
much guidance about how to delineate the overall concept space.) And if we are considering a 
wider range of design possibilities, without committing to the idea of a retrieval tool, then the 
guides provide little help.  
Part of the difficulty with these guides is a problem-solving orientation. If the problem is 
not to create a retrieval tool but to figure out what, if anything, to create, then it becomes very 
difficult to describe the design process in terms of precise methods and process steps. We can’t 
specify the means, because we aren’t sure of the ends. This difficulty is also a characteristic 
exhibited in Rittel and Webber’s (1973) idea of “wicked problems”: as they state, “the 
formulation of a wicked problem is the problem.” Instead of specifying both problem and 
solution in advance of working on them, Rittel and Webber contend that the problem and its 
solution should both emerge gradually, in tandem. Similarly, Donald Schon (1983) explains that 
“when ends are fixed and clear, then the decision to act can present itself as an instrumental 
problem. But when ends are confused and conflicting, there is as yet no ‘problem to solve.” 
From this perspective, problem setting (as Schon defines it, “a process in which, interactively, 
we name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to 
them”) becomes a key design issue. As an example, Schon describes an architecture professor 
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helping a student. The professor, “Quist,” is able to use domain knowledge of architectural 
possibilities and forms to have a “reflective conversation with the situation” that the student 
presents. This conversation opens up a new way of looking at the problem. Quist makes a 
suggestion, explores the implications of that suggestion, and comes up with new questions for 
the student to continue working with. Schon describes this as a “successful reframing” of the 
problem that leads to “the continuance of the conversation.” From this perspective, instead of 
figuring out how to make a retrieval tool fit a particular situation (solving a predefined problem), 
the classificationist might contemplate or prototype a solution (“hmmm...what if, instead of 
creating a single taxonomy for the entire company, we could create a basic template to be 
customized for different goals?”), see how that illuminates the design problem, and then use this 
information to decide how to proceed. The search for solutions is also a way to understand the 
problem better. Schon speaks of experiments—a solution is proposed and explored, revealing 
consequences and implications that provide more insight onto the design situation, in the same 
way that a scientific experiment provides evidence for or against a hypothesis.  
 
 
6. Research to facilitate problem setting for classification design 
What informs design experiments, and how is a proposed solution to be evaluated? In 
science, an experiment and the hypothesis it tests are typically grounded in previous work. The 
research question is presented as a gap in current knowledge, and a predictive hypothesis is made 
based on existing theories or models, or perhaps on previous findings. In design research, the 
orientation is similar, except that the idea of previous or related work focuses more narrowly on 
the individual designer’s skill, experience, and judgment. For example, Vetting Wolf, et al. 
(2006) criticize the problem-solving focus of “engineering design” for human-computer 
interaction, noting that many problems benefit instead from “creative design” and an emphasis 
on problem setting. The practice of creative design that they relate relies heavily on design 
judgment, or “the ability to assess, appreciate, and make appropriate decisions.” Design 
judgment pushes the non-linear design process that Vetting Wolf, et al .recount, informs the 
making of artifacts that they describe as central to progress and communication, and enables the 
critiques that they feel improve the evolving solution. Certainly, as good design may emerge 
from a variety of approaches to the situation and may take innumerable forms, there are 
significant limitations associated with the “engineering” ideal of design as a formalized linear 
process that proceeds from abstract to concrete, with clear divisions between design and 
implementation. However, reliance on individual skill, even with the deployment of 
multidisciplinary teams on design projects, as Vetting Wolf, et al. suggest, is not entirely 
satisfying as the means to ensure effective problem setting. Not all designers are experts, even 
those who may have been working in their fields for a long time.  
Lowgren and Stolterman (2004) suggest that markers of design expertise include a sense 
of quality, a language for description, and reflective thinking. The sense of quality pertains to 
both the product and to the design process. The language for description is a means to express 
the sense of quality (perhaps through descriptions, perhaps through prototypes). Reflective 
thinking pulls the sense of quality and language for description into practice. Designers must 
challenge themselves by reflecting on their own actions (what went wrong? what went right? 
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how do we move on from this apparent impasse?) and on the work of others (how does that 
artifact solve a similar problem to the one that I have?). The architect, Quist, that Schon (1983) 
describes also uses a language of design, in this case specific to architecture. Schon describes 
Quist’s language as including elements such as a building’s form, architectural style precedents, 
and qualities of the site. Quist’s fluency in the design language results from his deep experience 
with architecture. This experience also provides Quist with an extensive “repertoire” of design 
examples that he can apply or adapt to similar situations.  
A possibility for research to facilitate problem setting in classification design is to 
describe such a design language, one that enables the consistent expression of classification 
qualities. One can learn a language through immersion alone, but grammars and instruction 
books make the process easier, faster, and more systematic. Lowgren and Stolterman’s idea of 
product qualities could provide a model for formulating a classification design language. 
Lowgren and Stolterman claim that few useful attributes of digital artifacts can be measured with 
scientific evaluation methods. By articulating a more complete set of desirable attributes for 
digital artifacts (characteristics such as seductiveness, pliability, and transparency), they attempt 
to provide a framework for designers to better understand, evaluate, and effectively create these 
artifacts.   
To enumerate and describe such qualities for classification design, one might first attempt 
to analyze and map the design space (acknowledging that it can’t be fully mapped), by reviewing 
both literature about classifications and examining examples of classifications. From this review, 
a variety of artifacts or descriptions that represent the plurality of design possibilities can be 
selected, and the qualities that characterize them for good or ill described. Once derived, these 
qualities can then also be used as a basis for criticism, to show what makes design examples 
good or bad. Examples that are clearly explicated using the vocabulary of a design language can 
increase a designer’s “repertoire.” While using examples is a fairly typical practice in current 
practitioner guides, such as Rosenfeld and Morville’s (2002) primer on information architecture, 
the examples are typically not explicated or criticized systematically. The way these examples 
are currently used, one already needs a sense of design judgment to appreciate them.  
We might also think of the gradual selection and justification of qualities as a way to 
build a picture of an evolving design solution, becoming in addition a means to express the 
design process itself and give it more structure. As described by Floyd, et al. (1989) the work of 
Peter Naur argues “that the essential thing in developing software. . . is to build a theory on the 
domain under consideration.” Likewise, Rittel and Webber (1973) characterize the design 
process as “argumentative.” A similar motivation underlies the human-computer interaction 
methods of claims analysis and design rationale, in which decisions and alternatives in the design 
process are rigorously analyzed and documented (Carroll and Rosson, 1992; Moran and Carroll, 
1996). While implementations of design rationale, such as Questions, Options, and Criteria 
(QOC), are problematic due to their extreme detail and complexity, one can perhaps achieve 
some of the design rationale goals without the time-consuming documentation required with 
notations such as QOC (MacLean, et al., 1996; Buckingham Shum, 1996). The idea of using 
qualities to systematize the design process, as well as the product, is another possible research 
direction. A means to consistently express product qualities can provide an initial vocabulary to 
describe what the design should do and why this is a good solution.  
Feinberg, M. (2007).  Beyond retrieval: A proposal to expand the design space of classification.  






The tradition of Information Science is to perceive classification as a means to retrieve 
documents that match a user query. This idea has formed the basis of classification design from 
Hulme to Hjørland, making it appear necessary that a worthwhile classification must accurately 
document some state of affairs, be it the universe of knowledge, a particular subject area, or the 
work situation of a company. Examples of classification design outside of Information Science, 
however, suggest that retrieval tools form just one part of the possible design space. 
Classifications might be new interpretations of the world, as shown through work in philosophy 
and linguistics; they might structure and affect work practices, as opposed to passively reflecting 
them, as shown through work on information systems.  
None of this is to say that document classification might not be used for retrieval or 
should not attempt to replicate a particular knowledge system, if that makes sense for the 
situation. But a classification might organize documents in a useful or interesting way and yet 
not be a good retrieval tool. We have no problem thinking of, for example, the organization of 
artworks in an exhibition as being useful and interesting, perhaps for pedagogical purposes, or 
perhaps merely for aesthetic pleasure, and yet not suited for retrieval. One might use similar 
strategies for a Web site about art, or for a collection of art books. Moreover, as automatic search 
techniques become more sophisticated, the use of classifications for retrieval becomes less 
necessary and starts to seem anachronistic. Why focus on retrieval when classifications can do 
more?    
However, if one is interested in expanding the classification design space, the current 
guides and methods provide limited assistance. These manuals present classification work as a 
defined problem to be solved through the application of precise process steps. Such a problem-
solving orientation is insufficient for creative design problems. Instead, creative design stresses 
the importance of problem setting, of not assuming what you are trying to do, but of actively 
attempting to figure it out. Here we have a research opportunity for classification: is there a way 
to facilitate this problem-setting process? In design literature, reliance is typically placed on the 
skills, knowledge, and judgment of particular designers. Yet this approach seems haphazard. One 
idea is to develop a design language, perhaps derived from product qualities, as suggested by 
Lowgren and Stolterman (2004). Articulating such a language can provide a means for designers 
to communicate, form a base for the development of systematic criticism, and add a measure of 
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